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Abstract
Economies with asymmetric information are encompassed by an extension of the
model of general competitive equilibrium that does not require an explicit mod-
eling of private information. Sellers have discretion over deliveries on contracts;
this is in common with economies with default, incomplete contracts or price
rigidities. Competitive equilibria exist and anonymous markets are viable. But,
for a generic economy, aa competitive equilibrium allocations are constrained
suboptimal: there exist Pareto improving interventions via linear, anonymous
taxes.
Key words: asymmetric information, competitive markets, equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Asymmetric information plays an important role in the allocation of resources.
The implications of moral hazard and adverse selection have been analyzed
extensively from a game theoretic perspective, which has claried the nature
and implications of principal-agent relations, signaling, and contracts. This
analysis has been, mostly, conned, however, to situations that involve a small
number of individuals, which both limits its relevance and deprives it of the
advantages of anonymous trade.
The model of general competitive equilibrium allows, even requires, that in-
dividuals be many; it imposes no restrictions on their heterogeneity; it limits the
information of individuals to their characteristics and not those of others; and
it postulates, even explains that their behavior, deriving from their rationality,
is not strategic: it describes competitive markets.
We argue here that economies with asymmetric information are encompassed
by an extension of the model of general competitive equilibrium that does not
require an explicit modeling of private information. The modications include,
in the description of the economy,
- the exchange of commodities indirectly, through the exchange of contracts
that pay o¤ in multiple commodities,
- the ability of individuals to exercise discretion on the deliveries on con-
tracts, which derives from their private information, and
- the access of individuals to technologies that transform their endowments
prior to trade,
and, in the denition of equilibrium,
- the pooling of the deliveries of sellers and their distribution to buyers in
proportion to their purchases.
The main feature of models of asymmetric information, whatever the specic
nature of informational asymmetries, including both moral hazard and adverse
selection, is the discretion of sellers over deliveries on contracts. The pooling
of payo¤s guarantees equilibrium in the market for commodities when prices
attain equilibrium in the market for contracts; this was noted rst in Dubey,
Geanakoplos and Shubik (1990, 2005).
Deliveries on contracts remain under private control, while trades in con-
tracts take place in large anonymous markets and hence individual trades are
also only privately observable. The appropriate notion of constrained e¢ ciency
restricts therefore interventions to lump-sum transfers, common to all agents,
and the linear taxation of trades in contracts. Indeed, we show that for a
generic economy equilibria are not constrained e¢ cient; this conrms an insight
by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986).
An alternative approach to markets with asymmetric information was pi-
oneered by Prescott and Townsend (1984), 1 who studied the implementation
1Also, Kehoe, Levine and Prescott (2002) and Kocherlakota (1998).
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of incentive-constrained e¢ cient allocations as decentralized equilibria. To this
e¤ect, individual trades must be observable and appropriate restrictions on indi-
vidually feasible trades must be added in the equilibrium notion. Without these
restrictions, equilibria are not in general incentive-constrained e¢ cient2 . This
is in line with our result, which focuses on the polar case of large, anonymous
markets, where individual trades are not observable.
2 The economy and equilibrium
Individuals are i 2 I = f1; : : : ; Ig:
Commodities, are l 2 L = f1; : : : ; Lg; a bundle of commodities is3 x =
(: : : ; xl; : : :)
0:
Commodities are exchanged indirectly, through the exchange of contracts.
An individual is described by his consumption set, X i; a set of bundles of
commodities, his utility function over consumption bundles, ui; with domain
the consumption set, and by his endowment, ei; a bundle of commodities.
Contracts are m 2M = f1; : : : ;Mg:
A portfolio of contracts sold, short positions in the market for contracts,
is  = (: : : ; m; : : :)
0  0; a portfolio of contracts purchased, long positions
in the market for contracts, is  = (: : : ; m; : : :)0  0: The sale of m units
of contract m constitutes the obligation to deliver a bundle of commodities,
mdm = (: : : ; mdl;m; : : :)
0; where dm = (: : : ; dl;m; : : :)0  0 is also chosen by the
seller. On the other hand, the purchase of m units of the contract constitutes
the right to receive the bundle of commodities mrm = (: : : ; mrl;m; : : :)0; where
rm = (: : : ; rl;m; : : :)
0  0 equals the average deliveries made by sellers on the
contract.
The specication of each contract is thus given by a pair:
- Dm  RL+; that describes the restrictions on the per unit admissible de-
liveries on the contract: dm 2 Dm; and
- m  [0;1), describing the restrictions on admissible sales of the contract:
m 2 m:
The payo¤, rm; to buyers of the contract is then endogenously determined
at equilibrium by the average deliveries made by sellers within the set Dm:
The set Dm of deliveries on a contract need not be a singleton: the con-
tract need not specify exactly the delivery of a seller; this gives individuals
discretion on the bundle of commodities to deliver. Private information over
the characteristics of commodities delivered or, more generally, restricted con-
tractual enforceability are encompassed by appropriate specications of the set
of deliveries on the contract. For example, a set of deliveries of the form
Dm = fdm : d1;m + d2;m = 1; dl;m = 0; l 6= 1; 2g prescribes the delivery of
2Hammond (1987, 1989), Cole and Kocherlakota (2001), Citanna and Villanacci (2002),
Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007), Panaccione (2007), Fahri, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2009).
30denotes the transpose.
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one unit of a generic commodity (e.g. corn), which can be satised by deliv-
ering any combination of quantities of commodities 1 or 2 (e.g. two di¤erent
qualities of corn) that sum up to 1, at the discretion of the seller. Symmetric
information and full contractual enforceability correspond to the case where the
set of deliveries on each contract is a singleton.
The set m of sales of the contract need not coincide with the non -negative
real line: it need not allow arbitrary sales of the contract. If the set of sales of
the contract does coincide with the non-negative real line, individuals face no
constraints in the purchase of the contract and pricing is linear. Alternatively,
non-linearities in the pricing of a contract are encompassed by the specication
of di¤erent contracts, mk : k = 1; : : : ; with identical sets of deliveries, Dmk =
Dm1 ; but di¤erent sets of restrictions on sales, mk : arbitrary non-linear prices
can be encompassed with each mk identifying a range of transactions over
which pricing is linear.
Aggregate deliveries on each contract are pooled and distributed as payo¤
to buyers in proportion to their purchases of the contract, thus determining the
per unit payo¤ of the contract, exogenous for buyers:
rm
X
i2I
im  
X
i2I
dim
i
m = 0; m 2M:
Restrictions on the sales and deliveries on a contract, (dm; m) 2 Dmm;
are described independently of the characteristics of other contracts, and they do
not vary with the individual who sells the contract; this permits anonymity and
decentralization in the exchange of contracts. Joint restrictions on the deliveries
on a contract and the sales on the contract are encompassed by enlarging the
set of contracts.
Across contracts, the set of admissible sales of portfolios of contracts is  =
m2Mm; the set of admissible deliveries on contracts sold is D = m2MDm:
For a commodity, the deliveries on contracts are Dl = (: : : ; dl;m; : : :); across
contracts and commodities, the deliveries on contracts are
D = (: : : ; dm; : : :) = (: : : ; Dl; : : :)
0:
For a commodity, the payo¤s of contracts are Rl = (: : : ; rl;m; : : :); across
contracts and commodities, payo¤s of contracts are
R = (: : : ; rm; : : :) = (: : : ; rl; : : :)
0:
A commodity, l; can be traded directly if there exists a contract, m = l;
with deliveries given by the singleton set consisting of the unit vector 1Ll and
sales that coincide with the non- negative real line. If a commodity is traded
directly, one does not distinguish between the contract and the commodity.
Commodities l 2 ~L  L are not subject to resale; for these commodities
deliveries can only be made out of individuals initial endowments. This is
appropriate for commodities whose characteristics are private information of
individuals endowed with these commodities. Even though the set of deliveries
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on a contract is specied independently of the individual who delivers on the
contract, for commodities l 2 ~L  L not subject to resale, the endowment of an
individual may e¤ectively reduce the set of admissible deliveries. On the other
hand, for the commodities l 2 Ln ~L agents can make deliveries also out of the
bundles obtained as payo¤ of contracts traded and hence can exercise greater
discretion on the delivery on contracts.
An action by an individual, at payo¤s of contracts R; is
ai = (xi; i; i; Dii) 2 Ai(R);
where the domain of actions of the individual at payo¤s of contracts R is
Ai(R) =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
ai :
xi = ei +Ri  Dii 2 X i;
(i; Di) 2 D;
eil  Dili  0; l 2 ~L;
i  0:
9>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>;
:
Prices of contracts are q = (: : : ; qm; : : :):
At payo¤s of contracts purchased R and prices of contracts q; the budget set
of an individual is
i(q;R) =

(x; ; ;D) 2 Ai(R) : q(   )  0	 :
The optimization problem of an individual is
max ui(x)
s.t (x; ; ;D) 2 i(q;R):
Across individuals, a prole of actions is a = (: : : ; ai; : : :):
A state of the economy is (R; a); payo¤s of contracts and a prole of actions;
it is feasible if
rm
X
i2I
im  
X
i2I
dim
i
m = 0; m 2M:
A weaker feasibility condition requires that
R
X
i2I
i  
X
i2I
Dii = 0:
At a feasible state of the economy, markets for commodities clear for each
contract, as aggregate deliveries are pooled and distributed as payo¤ for each
contract. The weaker feasibility condition allows deliveries to be pooled across
contracts.
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Assumption 1. For every individual, the consumption set is the set of non-
negative bundles of commodities: X i = fx : x  0g; the utility function, ui; is
continuous and non-decreasing; the endowment is non-negative : ei  0:
This is standard.
Assumption 2. For every individual, the utility function is strictly monoton-
ically increasing in commodity l : ui(x + k 1Ll) > u
i(x); for all x 2 X i and
all k > 0; the endowment is strictly positive in commodity l : eil > 0; and
commodity l is traded directly: the per unit delivery on contract m = l 2 M
is one unit of commodity l and 0 of every other commodity: Dm = f1Llg; and
sales of the contract m are not restricted: m = [0;1):
This eliminates local satiation and minimum wealth points: the per unit
payo¤s of the contract m sold or purchased coincide, while the utility func-
tions of individuals are strictly monotonically increasing, and the endowments
of individuals are positive in the payo¤ of the contract; the price of the contract
is positive, and, for no individual is the endowment a minimum wealth point.
More generally, we could specify contractm as paying o¤ in many commodities.
Commodity l can be interpreted as a consumption commodity available
at contracting, which is exchanged directly; strict monotonicity of the utility
function and positivity of the endowment in commodity l are then natural.
Assumption 3. For every contract, 0 2 m; moreover, there exists an individ-
ual who can sell the contract: ei  dmm; for some (dm; m) 2 Dm m; with
m > 0:
This guarantees that the budget set of every individual is non-empty, and
that every contract is, e¤ectively, in positive aggregate supply.
Assumption 4. For every contract m 2 M n fmg, both the set of deliveries
on the contract, Dm; and the set of sales of the contract, m; are compact.
Compactness ensures that unbounded arbitrage opportunities do not arise;
with deliveries partly at the discretion of the sellers, there may be arbitrage
opportunities at all prices.
In a convex economy, for every individual,
1. the utility function, ui; is quasi-concave, and
2. the set of per unit deliveries on the contract, Dm; and the sets of sales of
the contract, m; are convex.
An economy is
E = fI;L; ~L;M; (X i; ui; ei) : i 2 I; ( Dm;m) : m 2Mg:
The model described above is the leading model ; it encompasses both the
standard competitive equilibrium models as well as economies with private in-
formation, default or price rigidities.
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Denition 1. A competitive equilibrium is (q; R; a); prices of contracts and
a state of the economy, such that
1. for every individual, the action ai = (xi; i; i; Dii) is a solution to
the optimization problem at prices and payo¤s of contracts (q; R);
2. the payo¤s of contracts lie in the set of deliveries of contracts: R 2 D;
3. the state of the economy (R; a) is feasible, and
4. the market for contracts clears:
P
i2I 
i  Pi2I i = 0:
If all commodities are traded directly, this is the denition of a competitive
equilibrium of Arrow and Debreu (1954) and McKenzie (1954), for an exchange
economy.
If the sets of deliveries on all contracts are singletons, while no sales restric-
tions are operative, this is the denition of a competitive equilibrium with an
incomplete asset market as in Radner (1972).
The feasibility condition (3) only restricts the payo¤ to buyers for traded
assets; condition (2) then imposes the rather mild requirement that payo¤s
of non-traded assets lie in the set of admissible deliveries on contracts, which
eliminates trivial no-trade equilibria, as long as 0 62 Dm.
Proposition 1. In a convex economy, competitive equilibria exist.
Proof : The set of prices of contracts is 4 Q = M 1:
The action correspondence of an individual, i; is dened by
i(q;R) =
f(x; ; ;D) 2 (q;R) : (x0; 0; 0; D00) 2 (q;R)) ui(x0)  u(x)g;
the set i(q;R) is the set of actions that maximize the utility function of the
individual over the budget set.
The compensated action correspondence of an individual, ~i; is dened by
~i(q;R) = f(x; ; ;D) 2 (q;R) :
(x^; ^; ^; D^^) 2 (q;R); and q(^   ^) < 0) ui(x^)  u(x)g;
the complement of the set ~i(q;R) with respect to the budget set is the set,
~ic(q;R) = f(x; ; ;D) 2 (q;R) :
ui(x^) > u(x); for some (x^; ^; ^; D^^) 2 (q;R); such that q(^   ^) < 0g;
of actions that are budget feasible but yield lower utility than some action that
satises the budget constraint with strict inequality.
4Kdenotes the simplex of dimension K.
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For n = M + 1; : : : ; the truncated set of prices of contracts is Qn = fq 2
M 1 : qm  (1=n);m 2Mg:
There exists a non-empty, compact, convex set Ain; such that ~i(q;R) 2 Ain;
for (q;R) 2 Qn D; across individuals, An = i2IAin:
For (q;R) 2 Qn  D; the budget set, i(q;R); is non-empty and compact.
Since the utility function is continuous, the set i(q;R) is non-empty and closed,
and, hence, compact; since ~i(q;R) contains i(q;R); it is non-empty, and, since
its complement, ~ic(q;R) is an open set, it is closed and, hence, compact.
The set ~i(q;R) is convex: if a^; ^^a 2 ~i(q;R); and 0    1; then a =
a^ + (1   )^^a 2 ~i(q;R): This follows from the quasi-concavity of the utility
function, as long as a 2 i(q;R); but this is the case: it su¢ ces to set m =
^m + (1  )^^m and dm = (^m=m)d^m + (1  )(^^m=m) ^^dm:
The compensated action correspondence, ~i; dened by ~i(q;R); is upper
hemi-continuous on Qn  D: If a sequence ((q;R)k 2 Qn  R : k = 1; : : :)
converges: limk!1(q;R)k = (q;R); an associated sequence of actions (ak =
(x; ; ;D)k : k = 1; : : :) is bounded and, without loss of generality it con-
verges: limk!1 ak = a = (x; ; ;D): If a 62 ~i(q;R); then there exists
a^ = (x^; ^; ^; D^^) 2 i(q;R); such that q(^   ^) < 0; and u(x^) > u(x): If the
sequence (a0k = (x^k; ^; ^; D^^) : k = 1; : : :) is dened by x^k = e
i +Rk^   D^^; by
the continuity of the utility function, there exists k; such that ui(x^k) > ui(xk);
for k = k; : : : : Since ak 2 ~i(qk; Rk); qk(^   ^)  0; and, as a consequence,
q(^   ^)  0; which contradicts q(^   ^) < 0; for k = k; : : : :
The correspondence  n = ( 
1
n;  
2
n;  
3
n); with domain and rangeQnD An;
is dened component-wise, by
 1n(q;R; a) = arg maxfq(
P
i2I 
i  Pi2I i) : q 2 Qng;
 2n;m(q;R; a) = (
P
i2I((1=n) + 
i
m))
 1P
i2I d
i
m((1=n) + 
i
m);
m 2M;
 3n(q;R; a) = i2I ~i(q;R);
in particular,  2n;m(q;R; a) = 1
L
l ; since d
i
m = 1
L
l :
The correspondence  n is non-empty, compact, convex, valued and upper
hemi-continuous, and, therefore, admits a xed point, (q; R; a)n:
The sequence of xed points ((q; R; a)n : n = M + 1; : : :); converges:
limn!1(q; R; a)n = (q; R; a):
From the monotonicity of the utility function in the payo¤ of contract
m; the value of the sales of contracts coincides with the value of the pur-
chases of contracts for every individual, and summation across individuals yields
that qn(
P
i2I 
i  Pi2I i)n = 0: From the denition of  1n; it follows that
q(
P
i2I 
i   Pi2I i)n = 0; for all q 2 Qn; and, in particular, for q =
(1=M; : : : ; 1=M); which implies that
P
m2M
P
i2I 
i
m;n 
P
m2M
P
i2I 
i
m;n;
since the sales of contracts lie in a compact set, without loss of generality, for
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individual i; portfolios of contracts purchased converge to i: This, in turn,
implies that the consumption bundle converges, to xi: The sequence of actions
(an : n = M + 1; : : :) thus converges: limn!1 a

n = a
:
At the prole of actions a; markets for contracts clear. Taking limits,
q(
P
i2I 
i   Pi2I i)  0; for all q 2 [n=M+1;:::Qn; which implies that
(
P
i2I 
i  Pi2I i)  0: If, for some contract, (Pi2I im  Pi2I im) < 0; a
modication of the demand of some individual, to im   (
P
i2I 
i
m  
P
i2I 
i
m)
assures market clearing.
The state of the economy (R; a) is feasible. At a xed point,
rl;m;n = (
X
i2I
((1=n)+im;n))
 1X
i2I
dil;m;n((1=n)+
i
m;n); l 2 L;m 2Mnfmg:
By direct substitution,X
i2I
xin  
X
i2I
ei = Rn(
X
i2I
in  
X
i2I
in ) +
X
i2I
(Din  Rn)1M (1=n);
and the right hand side converges to zero.
For every individual, ai = (xi; i; i; Dii) 2 ~i(q; R): If a^i 2 i(q;
R) is such that ui(x^i) > ui(xi); while q(^
i   ^i) < 0;then by the continuity
of the utility function, there exists n; such that ui(x^i) > ui(xin ); for n > n: The
sequence (a^in : n = M + 1; : : :) dened by x^
i
n = e
i + Rn^
i   D^i^i converges:
limn!1 x^in = x^
i; by the continuity of the utility function, there exists n; such
that ui(x^in) > u
i(xin ); for n > n: Since a^
i
n 2 ~i(qn; Rn); qn(^
i   ^i)  0; which
contradicts q(^
i   ^i) < 0:
The price of contract m is positive: qm > 0: If q

m = 0; there exists
a contract, m^ 2 M n fmg; with positive price: qm^ > 0: Either, for every
individual, im^ = 0 or, for some individual, i^; 
i^
m^ > 0: Since the utility function
of every individual is strictly monotonically increasing in the payo¤ of contract
m; ui(xi + 1Ll) > u
i(xi): Since i^m^ > 0; there exists n; such that, for n  n;
ui(xi+1Ll di^m^(1=n)) > ui(xi); but q(1Mm 1Mm^ (1=n)) < 0; which contradicts
ai^ 2 ~i^(q; R): If, for every individual, im^ = 0; a contradiction follows, since
there exists an individual who can sell the contract m^ : ei  dm^m^; for some
(dm^; m^) 2 Dm^  m^; with m^ > 0:
For every individual, ai = (xi; i; i; Dii) 2 i(q; R): The action
a^i = (x^i; ^
i
; ^
i
; Di^
i
); with x^i = ei + R^
i  Di^i; ^i = 0; and ^i = 1Mmeil ;
satises a^i 2 i(q; R) and q(^i ^i) =  qmeil < 0: If ai0 2 i(q; R) is such
that ui(xi0) > ui(xi); then setting ai = (1  )ai0 + a^i; for 0 <  < 1; by the
continuity of the utility function, contradicts ai 2 ~i(q; R); for  su¢ ciently
small. 2
The scope of the analysis is enlarged by allowing individuals access to private
technologies, Yi  RL  RL; that can be employed to transform endowments
prior to exchange.
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Assumption 5. For every individual, the technology is compact and it does not
allow for the transformation of commodity l : if (ei; yi) 2 Yi; yil = eil :
In a convex economy, for every individual, the technology Yi is convex.
An action by an individual, at payo¤s of contracts R; is ai = (xi; yi; i; i;
Dii); such that
- xi = yi + (Ri  Dii) 2 X i;
- (ei; yi) 2 Yi:
The denition of a competitive equilibrium for the model with production is a
standard extension of the previous one. The existence of competitive equilibria
for a convex economy follows by an immediate generalization of the earlier
argument.
2.1 Examples
The model encompasses instances of economies with asymmetric information,
as well as economies where the discretion over deliveries is generated by lim-
ited commitment, as in models of default, price rigidities or incompleteness of
contracts .
In simple economies, one commodity, moneyor consumption at the con-
tracting stage trades directly; it corresponds to commodity l in the formal
model and is often not mentioned explicitly. Also, when all other commodities,
usually l = 1; 2; trade through a single contract, the index 00m00 that identies
contracts is omitted.
Adverse selection occurs when the privately observed, but xed characteristics of
the sellers, preferences or endowments, determine their deliveries on contracts.
In the market for lemons in Akerlof (1974), each seller is endowed with
and can deliver either a car of high quality, commodity 1, or a car of low quality,
commodity 2.
A contract for the sale of a car is described by the delivery set
D = fd  0 : d1 + d2 = 1g :
The constraints
ei1   di1i  0;
ei2   di2i  0
imply that the informational advantage of sellers pertains exclusively to the
cars in their endowment: individuals are not distinguished by their ability to
recognize the quality of the engines of cars traded in the market. Sellers with
endowments ei2 = 0 are only able to sell cars of high quality.
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Similarly, in the insurance market in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), com-
modities 1 and 2 represent future consumption at state 1 and future con-
sumption at state 2, respectively. State 1 occurs with high probability, 1 >
(1=2):
Damage payments on insurance contract are restricted to the set
D = fd  0 : d1 + d2 = 1g:
Individuals who su¤er a loss at state 2, make premium payments at state 1,
which occurs with higher probability; they represent good risk.
Moral hazard occurs when unobservable choices by the seller, rather than his
characteristics, determine deliveries on contracts.
In the insurance market in Grossman and Hart (1983) deliveries on contracts
are restricted to the set
D = fd  0 : d1 + d2 = 1g;
where, again, commodities 1 and 2 represent future consumption at state 1
and future consumption at state 2,respectively, and state 1 occurs with high
probability, 1 > (1=2):
Here, however, individuals are endowed with a technology,
Y = f(e3; y1)  0 : y1 = ke3 g ;
that transforms a third commodity, leisure,into units of consumption at the
high probability state.
The conditions
yi1 + e
i
1   di1i  0;
ei2   di2i  0
guarantee that deliveries must come out of the endowments of individuals, as
transformed by the production activity, and hence depend on production choices
of sellers.
Exclusive contractual relationships in an insurance market with moral hazard or
adverse selection allow contracts to be di¤erentiated according to the quantity
traded. There is a large number, k 2 K = f1; : : : ;Kg; of contracts; all contracts
have the same set of deliveries
D = fd  0 : d1 + d2 = 1g;
they are distinguished by their sets of admissible sales
k = f0; kg:
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Across contracts, the set of admissible sales of portfolios is
 = f 2 k2Kk : k = k ) j = 0; for j 6= kg:
The specication, which violates the product structure of the general speci-
cation, implies that individuals can only trade a non-zero amount of only one
contract.
In this set-up, the pricing of contracts is e¤ectively non-linear.
Though the set of equilibria can be large, renements, as in Dubey, Geanako-
plos, Shubik (1990, 2005) or Gale (1992)) yield the same set of equilibria as in
Prescott and Townsend (1984).
Default is possible when sellers of a contract have the option of exchanging
utility penalties for payments of debts, as in Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik
(1990, 2005). If payments are denominated in commodity 1, while penalties are
denominated in commodity 2, the set of deliveries is
D = fd  0 : d1 + d2 = 1g;
where  > 0 measures the severity of the penalty; utility penalties are possibly
paid by debtors in a commodity whose consumption is of no interest to creditors.
In the case of collateral, as in Dubey, Geanakoplos and Zame (1996), creditors
derive utility from the consumption of the penalty commodity.
Signaling occurs in a market with adverse selection, when sellers of a commodity
of high quality or good risks are the only individuals endowed with a third
commodity, the ability to acquire education,as in Spence (1974). A contract
with signaling requires the delivery of the signaling commodity, 3, and
D = fd > 0 : d1 + d2 = 1; d3 = 1g:
Ownership and control, following Grossman and Hart (1986) may inuence the
nature of contracts. Commodity 1 is the consumption good and commodity 2
is the collateral good. There are two possible states of uncertainty. Contract
(m; s) accounts for the direct trade of commodity m in state of the world s. The
relative price of the collateral good in state s is q2sq1s : Control rights are allocated
to the seller if , as before, the set of deliveries of a collateralized debt contract
is
D = f(d1s; d2s)s=;  0; d1s + d2s = 1g:
When control rights are allocated to the buyer,
D = f(d1s; d2s)s=;  0 : d1s + d2s = 1; d2s > 0 if q2s
q1s
> g:
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The buyer accepts the delivery of the collateral good only in the state of the
world in which such good is worth more than the exchange rate implicit in the
contract, .
The possibility of renegotiation, as in Hart and Moore (1988), can be simi-
larly dealt with in this set-up.
Price rigidities and rationing occur when the price of a commodity, 1, is required
to equal the price of another commodity, 2. Buyers receive a given composition
of commodities 1 and 2 and are typically rationed in the commodity of most
desired quality.
3 E¢ ciency
The determination of the payo¤s of contracts by the choices of sellers at equi-
librium creates an externality, which is a source of ine¢ ciency.
A state of the economy, (R; a); is incentive-compatible if, for every individual,
ui(ei+Ri Dii)  ui(ei+Ri Di); for allD such that (ei+Ri Di) 2 X i:
A feasible and incentive-compatible state of the economy is incentive-e¢ cient
if no feasible and incentive-compatible state is Pareto superior.
Prescott and Townsend (1984) showed that incentive-e¢ cient allocations
obtain as equilibria with appropriate restrictions over trades.
Incentive-e¢ ciency restricts attention to interventions compatible with the
discretion of sellers over deliveries on contracts; but it requires full controllability
of individual trades, which is not satisfactory when trade takes place on large,
anonymous markets.
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) proposed the taxation of contracts and anony-
mous, lump-sum transfers as the appropriate intervention in a market economy
under asymmetric information and incentive compatibility constraints; it does
not require the trades or characteristics of individuals to be observable.
A scal authority imposes ad-valorem taxes on the sales of contracts, t =
(: : : ; tm; : : :), and redistributes revenue, T; to each individual.
At prices of assets and taxes (q; t; T ); the budget constraint of an individual
is
q   (q + t)  T  0;
the budget constraint of the scal authority is
t
X
i2I
i + IT  0:
A competitive equilibrium with taxation is (q; t; T ; R; a):
Taxation implements a state of the economy, (R^; a^); if there exist prices of
assets and taxes, (q^; t^; T^ ); such that (q^; t^; T^ ; R^; a^) is a competitive equilibrium
with taxation.
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Denition 2. A competitive equilibrium is constrained suboptimal if there is a
Pareto superior state of the economy (R; a), implementable by taxes (t; T ).
In what follows we focus attention on economies with adverse selection, in
which the deliveries on contracts, Di; are an exogenous characteristic of each in-
dividual. This makes the argument establishing generic constrained ine¢ ciency
both simpler and clearer. Such argument follows the one used by Geanako-
plos and Polemarchakis (1986) and Citanna, Kajii and Villanacci (1998) for
economies with an incomplete asset market.
In recent work, Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (2008) showed that the
taxation of exchanges implements Pareto improvements in abstract economies
with externalities, while Citanna, Polemarchakis and Tirelli (2006) obtained an
analogous result for economies with an incomplete asset market.
In a smooth, convex economy, for every individual, the utility function, ui; is
twice continuously di¤erentiable on the interior of the consumption set; Dui is
strictly positive, while D2ui is negative denite on the orthogonal complement
of Dui; the endowment, ei; is strictly positive and strictly preferred to any
consumption plan on the boundary of the consumption set.
With taxation, the rst order conditions for an interior optimum of the
individual optimization problem are
Dui   i = 0;
R0i0   q0i = 0;
 Di0i0 + (q0 + t0)i = 0;
 xi + ei +Ri  Dii = 0;
 qi + (q + t)i + T = 0;
where i = (: : : ; il; : : :) are the strictly positive Lagrange multipliers associated
with the constraints  x+ ei +Ri  Dii = 0; and i is the positive Lagrange
multiplier associated with the constraint qi   (q + t)i   T = 0:
The market clearing conditions areP
i2I(^
i   ^i) = 0;P
i2I ~
i ~R Pi2I ~i ~Di = 0;
t
P
i2I 
i + IT = 0;
where ^
i
= (i1; : : : ; 
i
M 1); ^
i
= (i1; ::; 
i
M 1); ~
i is an (LM  LM) diagonal
matrix with elements ~ilm;lm = 
i
m; ~R and ~D
i are LM -vectors (: : : ; rlm; : : :);
(: : : ; dlm; : : :):
Di¤erentiating the above equations one obtains, by repeated substitution,
that
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P
i
Dui
i
dxi =
P
m
P
i 
i
m
Dui
i
drm =
=  Pm qmPi dim +Pm 1P
i 
i
m
P
i 
i
m(
P
j
Dui
i
djmd
j
m):
A necessary condition for a Pareto improvement to exist is that this sum be
di¤erent from zero. It is immediate that this necessary condition is violated if,
at equilibrium, the normalized gradients of the utility functions of individuals
are collinear or if the delivery choices of individuals are similar, so that
Dui
i
djm = qm; for all i; j and m:
Thus, for Pareto improvement it is necessary that individuals be su¢ ciently
diverse in their deliveries, in a sense to be made precise, while the market is
su¢ ciently incomplete.
The way to an improvement is via changes in the matrix of payo¤s, R;
induced by changes in the supplies of sellers, i  the externality discussed
earlier. Even if the deliveries of individuals are di¤erent, aggregate payo¤s can
be modied in su¢ ciently many directions by taxes and transfers only if the
reactions of sellers to changes in taxation do not o¤set each other. For this,
it is necessary to perturb the second derivatives of utility functions around the
equilibrium.
Assumption 6. For every individual, everywhere in the interior of the con-
sumption set and for every bx 6= 0; the subspace5
[Di(D
2
x;xu
ibx)y : D
2
i;xu
iy = 0];
has full dimension, L:
This ensures that, at an interior allocation, it is possible to perturb fully the
matrix of second derivatives of the utility functions of individuals, while leaving
the rst derivatives una¤ected, as perturbations along the set of competitive
equilibrium prices and allocations require; Citanna, Kajii and Villanacci (1998)
developed the construction in full.
An economy is described by ! = (: : : ; (ei; i); : : :); where i; a vector of
dimension,  i parameterizes the utility function of agent i;  = (: : : ; i; : : :);
and   =
P
i2I  
i: The set of economies is an open set, 
; of dimension IL+  :
5[ ] denotes the subspace spanned by a collection of vectors or the column span of a
matrix.
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The function G is dened by
G(;  ; !) =
0BBBBBBBBBB@
...
F i
...
E
1CCCCCCCCCCA
;
where  = (: : : ; (xi; i; i; i; i); : : : ; q^; R); a vector of dimension n = I(2L +
2M+1)+(M 1)+LM; and  = (t^; T ); a vector of dimensionM: The equations
F i = 0 are the rst order conditions for a solution to the individual optimization
problem, while E = 0 are the market clearing conditions at a competitive equi-
librium with taxation. The analogous function without taxation, where  = 0,
and the last equation in E is dropped, is G^(; !):
Interior competitive equilibria, ; of an economy, !; are solutions of G^(; !) =
0; with all variables in the interior of their domain of denition.
A regular interior competitive equilibrium is such that dim[DG^] = n:
Denition 3. A competitive equilibrium of a smooth, convex economy displays
su¢ cient diversity of individuals if
1. for every individual, dim[R;Di] = 2M ;
2. for every contract, dim[i;j = 
j
m
Duj
j
[rm   dim] : (i; j) 2 I  I] = I:
The rst condition implies that, at the competitive equilibrium, deliveries
made by individuals are su¢ ciently di¤erent so that they are never collinear
to average deliveries, while the second requires that there be su¢ cient diver-
sity among individuals. In particular, if gradients were collinear, (Duj=j) =
(Dui=i) or if deliveries were not di¤erentiated, dj = di, the elements i;j would
be null.
Proposition 2. In a smooth, convex economy with adverse selection, if
1. M > I; L > 2M; and
2. for an open set of economies, competitive equilibria are regular interior
and display su¢ cient diversity of individuals6 ,
then, for an open and dense subset of this set of economies, competitive equilibria
are constrained suboptimal.
6 In condition 2. we assume the existence of an open set of economies whose equilibria are
regular and interior. This is a stronger assumption than needed, it would be enough to assume
the existence of an open set of economies whose equilibria are regular, without requiring
interiority. The existence of such an open set of economies has been proved in similar settings
(e.g. with short sales constraints and endogenous asset payo¤s) by Geanakoplos, Magill,
Quinzii and Drèze (1990); see also Villanacci et al. (2002), chapter 14.
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Proof : The function H is dened by
H(; b; !) =
0BBBB@
G^(; !)
D; (G(; 0; !); U(; 0; !))
0b)
kbk   1
1CCCCA ;
where b = (: : : ; (bix; b
i
; b
i
; b
i
; b
i
); : : : ; bq; bR; bT ; : : : ; b
i
u; : : :) is of dimension n +
1+I; while U(; 0; ! = (: : : ; ui(xi); : : :): If the function H is transverse to 0, the
result follows. This is the case since, for a given !; the number of equations,
(n+ (n+M) + 1); is greater than the number of unknowns, (n+ (n+ 1 + I)):
As a consequence, if H is transverse to 0; for a generic set of ! there is no (; b)
at which H(; b; !) = 0; that is, at an equilibrium , the ((n + 1 + I)  (n +
M)) matrix D; (G;U) has full row rank. In particular, a Pareto improving
intervention exists; again, Citanna, Kajii and Villanacci (1998) developed the
construction in full.
The function H is transverse to 0 if the Jacobian matrix
DH =
0BBBB@
DG^ 0 D!G^
D(D; (G;U)
0b) D; (G;U)0 D!(D; (G;U)0b)
0 b0 0
1CCCCA
has full row rank whenever H(; b; !) = 0:
The columns of D!G^ that correspond to derivatives with respect to  are
DG^; the only non-zero elements are D2i;xu
i: Similarly, in D(D; (G;U)0b);
the only non-zero elements are Di(D2x;xu
ibix) and D
2
i;xu
ibiu: Under assumption
8, one can restrict attention to perturbations such that, for every individual,
D2i;xu
i = 0:
At a regular equilibrium, DG^ has rank n. The problem then reduces to
showing that, whenever H(; b; !) = 0; the matrix
K =
0@ D; (G;U)0 D(D; (G;U)0b)
b0 0
1A
has full row rank, where the columns of D(D; (G;U)0b) corresponding to
i are of the form Di(D; (G;U)0b) = (0; : : : ; 0; Di(D2x;xu
ibix); 0; : : : ; 0)
0 =
(0; : : : ; 0; N i(b); 0; : : : ; 0)0:
For full row rank of K, it su¢ ces that any z = K can be generated by an
appropriate choice of
 = (: : : ; (ix;
i
;
i
;
i
;
i
); : : : ;q;R;T ; : : : ;
i
u; : : : ; : : : ;
i
 ; : : :);
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explicitly,
z1:i = D
2uiix   IMi +Duiiu +N i(b)i ;
z2:i = R
0i   q0i + I^Mq;
z3:i =  Di0i + q0i   I^Mq + ( R0   Di
0
)R;
z4:i =  IMix +Ri  Dii;
z5:i =  qi + qi;
z6 =  
P
i2I(
ii) +
P
i2I(
ii) 
P
i2I(^
i   ^i)i;
z7 =
P
i2IM
i0i +
P
i2 I 
i0i +
P
i2I ~
i0R;
z8 =
P
i2I 
ii +
P
i2I 
ii +
P
i2I 
ii;
z9 =
P
i2I 
i
 + IT ;
z10 =
P
i2I b
ii + bqq + bRR + bTT +
P
i2I b
i
u
i
u;
where I^M is the (M  (M   1)) matrix obtained by adding a last row of ze-
ros to the (M   1)-dimensional identity; i is the transpose of I^M multiplied
by the scalar i; M i is an (M  LM) matrix whose m-th row is of the form
(0; : : : ; i0; : : : ; 0); with non-zero elements corresponding to the m-th block of
columns; i is an (L  LM) matrix whose m-th block of columns is the L-
dimensional identity times the scalar im; R is an (LM M); block diagonal
matrix whose columns are of the form (0; r1m; r2m; : : : ; rLm; 0); and similarly for
D^i:
If bix 6= 0; one can restrict attention to perturbations such that N i(b) =
DiD
2
x;xu
ibix has full rank, L; so that the elements z1:i can be controlled by 
i
 :
If, on the other hand bix = 0, the matrix N
i(b) vanishes, and perturbation of i
have no e¤ect.
First, bix 6= 0; for all i:
The rst seven elements of z can be controlled using ((i)i2I ;q;R); be-
cause the corresponding matrix of coe¢ cients is the Jacobian DG^ which has
full rank n at a regular equilibrium. The problem then reduces to showing that
the remaining three elements can be controlled independently.
To control z8, one uses the rst (M   1) elements of 1. This upsets z6
and the elements z4:1 and z5:1, corresponding to individual 1. One uses 1M
to readjust z5:1, and 1x to readjust z4:1. This last move upsets z1:1, but N
1(b)
has full rank L and one can adjust 1 : To readjust z6 one uses the rst (M  1)
elements of 1: This again moves z4:1 and z5:1 , which can be undone as before.
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But it also moves z7. To undo this, one needs to use R , which upsets z3:i
for all i: Here there is a problem: to adjust these elements one should use i
which moves z2:i and z7 itself (and z1:i, but this can be undone by i). One
needs an argument to show that one can move i and R jointly to control
z2:i , z3:i and z7. At a regular equilibrium, this is true. One considers the
(2MI + LM)-dimensional subsystem of equilibrium equations
 xi + ei +Ri  Dii = 0;P
i2I ~
i ~R Pi2I ~i ~Di = 0;
where, of the rst equations, one keeps only those corresponding to 2M linearly
independent rows of [R;Di]: Taking derivatives with respect to ((i; i; ei)i2I ; R)
one obtains a matrix of full row rank. But then, for generic endowments, the
(2MI +LM) square matrix of derivatives with respect to ((i; i)i2I ; R) is full
rank. This is exactly the matrix that allows one to jointly control z2:i, z3:i and
z7.
To nish the argument, z9 can be controlled by T (this upsets z8, which
can be readjusted as before), and z10 by iu corresponding to b
i
u 6= 0 (this
upsets z1:i, to be readjusted by i). That a b
i
u 6= 0 exists follows from the fact
that, if for all i biu = 0, then D; (G(; 0; !); U(; 0; !))
0b = 0 and regularity of
equilibrium imply b = 0, which is impossible at a zero of H.
Second, for some, i bix = 0.
For any one of the (nitely many) possible cases, a perturbation argument
similar to the one above is possible.
At a zero of H, it cannot be the case that for all i bix = 0. The equations in
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H = 0 corresponding to D; (G(; 0; !); U(; 0; !))0b) = 0 are
D2uibix   IMbi +Duibiu = 0;
R0bi   q0bi + I^Mbq = 0;
 Di0bi + q0bi   I^Mbq + ( R0   Di0)bR = 0;
 IMbix +Rbi  Dibi = 0;
 qbi + qbi = 0;P
i2I 
i(bi   bi) 
P
i2I(^
i   ^i)bi = 0;P
i2IM
i0bi +
P
i2I 
i0bi +
P
i2I ~
ibR = 0;P
i2I 
ibi +
P
i2I ^
i
(bi + bT ) = 0;P
i2I(b
i
 + bT ) = 0:
If bix = 0, the fourth equation and dim[R;D
i] = 2M immediately imply
bi = b
i
 = 0: From the second, third and seventh equations, and the rst order
conditions,one obtains that, for all i and all m;X
j2I
jbju
jm
m
[qm   Du
j
j
dim] = 0;
this implies that biu = 0; for all i: But then, substitution in the above equations
yields b = 0; which is impossible at a zero of H:
If bix = 0 for i 2 Ik; a subset of individuals, then bi = bi = 0; for all
i 2 Ik:Moreover, from the second equation above and the rst order conditions,
ibiu   bi = 0. One can then write a new system of equations Hk = 0, in
which, for each i 2 Ik, one adds these L + 2M + 1 equations and drops those
corresponding to z2:i, z3:i , z4:iand z5:i: The number of equations is unchanged,
but now the elements in z = K corresponding to i 2 Ik are
z1:i = D
2uiix   IMi +Duiiu;
z2:i = 
i
;
z3:i = 
i
;
z4:i = 
i
x;
z5:i = 
iiu  i:
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The perturbation argument then goes by noticing that, for i 2 Ik, we
can control z1:i with i (this a¤ects z7 , but now R can be moved without
interfering with z2:i and z3:i, for i 2 Ik).
For at least one i, bix 6= 0. This individual allows one to perturb z8. For the
individuals in I n Ik, whose elements z2:i and z3:i are perturbed by R but for
whom we can use the i , the argument is exactly the same used above.
For each possible Ik, an application of the transversality theorem gives a
dense subset of the set of economies O, in which it cannot be the case that
Hk = 0, that is it cannot be the case that H = 0 and bix = 0 for all i 2 Ik.
Openness of the sets follows from standard arguments. The intersection of these
nitely many sets is a dense set of economies in which it cannot be the case that
H = 0. 2
4 Extensions
The convexity of the sets of sales of contracts and of the deliveries on con-
tracts as well as the quasi-concavity of the utility functions of individuals that
characterize a convex economy fail in important cases. For instance, possible
non-linearities in the pricing of contracts are captured, as already argued, by a
nonconvex trading set :
A large economy allows for competitive equilibria in non-convex environ-
ments.
The access of individuals to private technologies that allow the transforma-
tion of endowments prior to exchange also expands the scope of the model.
Individuals are i = (t; n) 2 I = T  N ; where T = f1; : : : ; Tg is a non-
empty, nite set of types, and N = f1; : : : g is a countably innite set of names
of individuals.
A type is described by the consumption set, X t; the utility function, ut; the
endowment, et; and the technology, Yt; a set of pairs of bundles of commodities.
An action by an individual of type t; at payo¤s of contracts R; is
at;n = (xt;n; yt;n; t;n; t;n; Dt;nt;n);
where the domain of actions of the individual at payo¤s of contracts R is
At(R) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
at :
xt;n = yt;n + (Rt;n  Dt;nt;n) 2 X t;
(et; yt;n) 2 Yt;
(i; Di) 2 D;
(t;n; Dt;n) 2 (;D);
yt;nl  Dt;nl t;n  0; l 2 ~L;
t;n  0:
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
:
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At payo¤s of contracts R; a simple distribution of actions of individuals of
type t is a pair (t; t); where t = (: : : ; t;k; : : :) is a probability measure on
a nite set, and t = (: : : ; at;k; : : :) associates an action of individuals of type t
with every element of the support of the measure t: For type t; the aggregate
portfolio of contracts purchased is
t = Et
t;k;
the aggregate portfolio of contracts sold is
t = Et
t;k;
and the aggregate delivery on contracts is
EtD
t;kt;k:
Across types, a prole of simple distributions of actions is (; ) = (: : : ; (t;
t); : : :):
A state of the economy is (R; ; ); payo¤s of contracts and a prole of simple
distributions of actions; it is feasible if
rm
X
t2T
tm  
X
t2T
Etd
t;k
m 
t;k
m = 0; m 2M:
A weaker feasibility condition requires that
R
X
t2T
t  
X
t2T
EtD
t;kt;k = 0:
For economies that are not convex, additional assumptions are required to
eliminate minimum wealth points.
Assumption 7. For every individual, for consumption bundles x and x^; xl = 0
and x^l > 0) ui(x^) > ui(x): For contracts m 2Mnfmg; dm 2 Dm ) dl;m =
0:
A consumption bundle with zero consumption of commodity l yields lower
utility than any bundle with positive consumption of the commodity, and con-
tract m is the only contract that e¤ects exchanges of the commodity l:
The economy is
E = fT ;L; ~L;M; (X t; ut; et;Yt) : t 2 T ; (Dm;m) : m 2Mg:
At payo¤s of contracts purchased, R; and prices of contracts q; the budget
set of an individual of type t is
t(q;R) =

(x; y; ; ;D) 2 At(R) : q(   )  0	 :
The optimization problem of an individual of type t is
max ut(x)
s.t (x; y; ; ;D) 2 t(q;R):
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Denition 4. A competitive equilibrium for the large economy model is (q; R;
; ); prices of contracts and a state of the economy, such that
1. for every type of individuals, every action, at;k = (xt;k; yt;k; t;k; t;k;
Dt;kt;k); in the support of the measure t; is a solution to the opti-
mization problem at prices and payo¤s of contracts (q; R);
2. the payo¤s of contracts lie in the convex hull of the set of deliveries of
contracts7 : R 2 ConD;
3. the state of the economy (R; ; ) is feasible, and
4. the market for contracts clears:
P
t2T Et
t;k  Pt2T Ett;k = 0:
Proposition 3. In a large economy, competitive equilibria exist.
Proof : The action correspondence of an individual of type t is t(q;R);
the compensated action correspondence is ~t(q;R): Since the convex hull of an
upper hemi-continuous correspondence is upper hemi-continuous, an argument
as in the proof of proposition 1 yields a pair (q; (R; aT ); of prices of contracts
and a feasible state of the reduced economy with a representative individual for
each type, such that at 2 Con ~t(q; R); for every individual.
For K = 2L+ 2M +LM + 1; there exists a simple distribution of actions of
individuals of type t; (t; t); with t = (: : : ; t;k; : : :); t = (: : : ; at;k; : : :);
such that at;k 2 t(q; R); for k = 1; : : : ;K; and at = Etat;k:
The state of the economy (R; ; ) is feasible: markets for commodities
clear.
As in proposition 1, qm > 0:
For every type of individuals, and for every element of the support of the
measure t; the action at;k is a solution to the optimization problem at prices
and payo¤s of contracts (q; R): If not, there exists a 2 t(q; R) with ut(x) >
ut(xt;k): The only way to exchange commodity l is through contract m :
xl = el + m  m : If xl = 0; then, by the strong desirability of commodity
l; xl = 0; which is not possible: from the endowment, the individual can
reduce net sales of m and still be strictly better o¤ than at x; a contradiction.
If xl > 0; then the individual can increase net sales of contract m; and nd an
action a^ 2 t(q; R) with ut(x^) > ut(xt;k) and q(^  ^) < 0; a contradiction.
2
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